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Abstract 
We provide an overview of experimental literature on contests and point out the two main 
phenomena observed in most contest experiments: (i) overbidding relative to the standard Nash 
equilibrium prediction and (ii) heterogeneous behavior of ex-ante symmetric contestants. Based 
on the sample of contest experiments that we review, the median overbidding rate is 72%. We 
provide different explanations for the overbidding phenomenon, including bounded rationality, 
utility of winning, other-regarding preferences, probability distortion, and the shape of the payoff 
function. We also provide explanations for heterogeneous behavior of contestants based on 
differences in preferences towards winning, inequality, risk and losses, and demographic 
differences. Furthermore, we suggest mechanisms that can reduce overbidding and induce more 
homogeneous behavior. Finally, we discuss directions for future research. 
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1. Introduction 
Many examples of competition have the property that multiple agents exert costly 
irreversible efforts while competing for a prize but only one agent receives the prize. Such costly 
competitions between economic agents are often portrayed as contests. Examples include rent-
seeking contests, R&D competitions between firms, patent races, and competitions for 
promotion. These environments have attracted the attention of many prominent theorists and 
have yielded a number of interesting theoretical predictions; for a comprehensive review of 
theoretical literature see Konrad (2009). Some of these predictions have been tested empirically 
using field data (Prendergast, 1999; Szymanski, 2003). Most of the empirical studies, however, 
focus solely on investigating whether the pattern of outcomes in contests is consistent with the 
comparative static predictions, since it is difficult to measure the actual effort expended by 
players in the field (Ericsson and Charness, 1994). 
Controlled laboratory experiments give researchers the ability to measure the actual effort 
in contests, while controlling for relative abilities of contestants and the amount of noise in the 
contest.
1
 Almost all experimental studies are based on three canonical models – contests 
(Tullock, 1980), rank-order tournaments (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), and all-pay auctions 
(Hirshleifer and Riley, 1978; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Hillman and Riley, 1989). For a 
comprehensive review of a rapidly growing experimental literature on contests, all-pay auctions 
and tournaments, see Dechenaux et al. (2012). Although certain assumptions underlying the 
three canonical models are different, all three models assume that (i) players exert costly 
                                                 
1
 It is still possible that subjects who are assigned ex-ante symmetric roles in contests may still differ in their skills 
(abilities) of playing the experimental game (i.e., differences in cognitive ability, understanding the incentives, 
learning, etc.). However, the luxury of experimental approach is that these “hidden abilities” can be measured and 
controlled for in the laboratory using different methods and elicitation procedures.    
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irreversible efforts while competing for a prize and (ii) an individual player’s probability of 
winning the prize depends on the players’ relative expenditures. 
Contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments have traditionally been applied to different 
areas of economic analysis. Contests have been commonly used in the study of R&D races and 
political or rent-seeking competitions (Millner and Pratt, 1989; Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et 
al., 1998; Sheremeta, 2010, 2011; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; Price and Sheremeta, 2011, 2012; 
Morgan et al., 2012). The commonly observed finding from contest experiments, first 
documented by Millner and Pratt (1989), is that there is significant overbidding relative to the 
standard Nash equilibrium prediction. Such overbidding is not desirable, since in the context of 
rent-seeking competitions where contests have often been applied, a welfare maximizing social-
planner seeks to minimize socially wasteful expenditures (Tullock, 1980).
2
 
Rank-order tournaments have been used in the principal-agent, contract design and labor 
literatures (Bull et al., 1987; Schotter and Weigelt, 1992; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2011; 
Sheremeta and Wu, 2011; Agranov and Tergiman, 2013; Eisenkopf and Teyssier, 2013). 
Contrary to contest experiments, the common finding from tournament experiments, which was 
first documented by Bull et al. (1987), is that the average effort levels in tournaments are well 
predicted by theory. Such efforts in rank-order tournaments are usually viewed as valuable 
because they contribute to the firm’s output. 
Finally, all-pay auctions have been used in the auction literature and in lobbying and 
military applications (Barut et al., 2002; Noussair and Silver, 2006; Gneezy and Smorodinsky, 
2006; Lugovskyy et al., 2010; Kovenock et al., 2010; Deck and Sheremeta, 2012; and 
Chowdhury et al., 2013). Similarly to contest experiment, all-pay auction experiments find 
                                                 
2
 In the context of R&D and patent races, however, a social planner may desire the positive externalities generated 
from increased research spending. 
 4 
significant overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction. Also, as in contests, 
overbidding in all-pay auctions is not desirable. 
In this paper, we restrict our attention mostly to contests (Tullock, 1980). The main 
reasons we focus on contests are that (i) contests have attracted most attention from experimental 
researchers and (ii) the results and phenomena observed in contest experiments are very robust 
and demand rigorous and comprehensive explanations. This paper attempts to provide such 
explanations. 
We begin by introducing a simple theoretical contest model in Section 2. In Section 3, we 
provide an overview of experimental literature on contests and point out the two main 
phenomena observed in almost all contest experiments: (i) overbidding relative to the standard 
Nash equilibrium prediction and (ii) heterogeneous behavior of ex-ante symmetric contestants. 
In Section 4 we provide explanations for the overbidding phenomenon, including bounded 
rationality, utility of winning, other-regarding preferences, probability distortion, and the shape 
of the payoff function. We also suggest mechanisms that can reduce overbidding. In Section 5 
we provide explanations for heterogeneous behavior of contestants based on differences in 
preferences towards winning, inequality, risk and losses, and demographic differences. We also 
discuss several mechanisms that can reduce heterogeneity of individual behavior. Section 6 
concludes and suggests directions for future research. 
 
2. A Simple Contest Model 
Perhaps the simplest contest model is a lottery contest proposed by Tullock (1980). In 
such a contest, there are   identical risk-neutral players competing for a prize value of  . The 
probability that player   wins the prize depends on player  ’s effort    and the efforts of all other 
 5 
    players. Specifically, player  ’s probability of winning the prize is defined by a contest 
success function (CSF) (Skaperdas, 1996): 
           
  
∑   
 
   
.         (1) 
Given CSF (1), the expected payoff for player   is 
 (          )                .       (2) 
That is, the probability of winning the prize            times the prize value   minus the cost of 
effort         . Differentiating (2) with respect to    and accounting for the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium leads to a standard solution (Tullock, 1980): 
   
     
  
 .          (3) 
There are no asymmetric equilibria in the lottery contest and the symmetric equilibrium (3) is 
unique (Szidarovszky and Okuguchi, 1997). Given (3), the probability of winning in the 
equilibrium is     and the expected payoff is           . In a classic formulation of a 
Tullock contest efforts are considered as wasteful rent-seeking expenditures. The Pareto optimal 
level of effort is      . In such a case, the probability of winning is still    , but the expected 
payoff is           . 
 
3. Experimental Findings on Contests 
The first attempt to examine a lottery contest using a laboratory experiment dates back to 
Millner and Pratt (1989). In their experiment, subjects are placed in groups of two (i.e.,    2) 
and the composition of the groups changes from period to period. Each period, subjects submit 
their efforts (bids) in order to win a prize of $8 (i.e.,    8). Given these parameters, the unique 
equilibrium effort from equation (3) is               2. The two main findings of Millner 
and Pratt (1989) are that (i) average effort is significantly higher than the risk-neutral Nash 
 6 
equilibrium prediction (overbidding) and (ii) there is a high variance in individual efforts 
(heterogeneous behavior).
3
 
Since Millner and Pratt (1989), many other experiments have replicated the phenomena 
of overbidding and heterogeneity of efforts. Table 1 presents a summary of lottery contest 
experiments with symmetric players. Two main conclusions can be made regarding overbidding. 
First, overbidding is a widespread phenomenon observed in almost all experimental contest 
studies. Out of 30 studies, 28 studies document statistically significant overbidding. The median 
overbidding rate, defined as          , is 72%, and in some studies the overbidding rate is so 
high that subjects on average earn negative payoffs (Abbink et al., 2010; Sheremeta and Zhang, 
2010; Price and Sheremeta, 2011, 2012; Chowdhury et al., 2012; Lim et al., 2012; Morgan et al., 
2012). Second, the overbidding rate across the 28 studies that find significant overbidding is 
quite different, ranging from 10% to 256%. From a first glance it is difficult to ascertain what 
causes such differences in overbidding rates. However, it is clear that there are many procedural 
and design differences that may be important. For example, most experiments employ either 
fixed or random matching protocols (Andreoni and Croson, 2008). When subjects face the same 
opponents for a number of periods (fixed matching) they may learn how to collude by reducing 
their efforts (Lugovskyy et al., 2010).
4
 Also, before participating in the contest, subjects are 
usually endowed with a certain amount of experimental currency that allows them to exert efforts 
(make bids) in the contest (Price and Sheremeta, 2011, 2012). In some studies, the endowment is 
                                                 
3
 Similar phenomena are also observed in all-pay auctions with complete information (Davis and Reilly, 1998; 
Gneezy and Smorodinsky, 2006; Lugovskyy et al., 2010; Kovenock et al., 2010; Klose and Sheremeta, 2012; Ong 
and Chen, 2012; Mago and Sheremeta, 2012; Deck and Sheremeta, 2012) and incomplete information (Barut et al., 
2002; Noussair and Silver, 2006; Dechenaux and Mancini, 2008; Müller and Schotter, 2010; Hyndman et al., 2012). 
For a review see Dechenaux et al. (2012). 
4
 Collusion is clearly an issue in the context of auctions (see Klemperer, 2002). A common way to deal with this is 
to randomly re-match subjects after each period of play. However, there is no general agreement on how matching 
protocol influences individual behavior. In public good games, for example, some studies find more cooperation 
under random matching, some find more under fixed marching, and some fail to find any difference at all (Andreoni 
and Croson, 2008; Botelho et al., 2009). 
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higher than the prize value (i.e., Millner and Pratt, 1989) and in other studies it is lower (Shogren 
and Baik, 1991). Finally, it is possible that the overbidding rate depends on the number of 
contestants. 
We examine what factors can explain differences in overbidding rates across the 30 
studies reported in Table 1 by estimating a simple OLS regression (a unit of observation is an 
average over an entire study), where the dependent variable is the overbidding rate           
and the independent variables are the relative (to the prize value) size of endowment, the number 
of contestants n, a dummy-variable for the fixed matching protocol, and a constant.
5
 The 
estimated regression (with ** and *** indicating significance at 0.05 and 0.01 level and standard 
errors in parentheses) is: 
                        ⏟  
      
                 ⏟   
      
      ⏟
      
             ⏟  
      
        .   (4) 
This simple model explains 45% of variation in the sample (adjusted R-squared is 0.45). The 
regression shows that the overbidding rate increases (i) in the relative size of endowment (p-
value = 0.04) and (ii) in the number of contestants (p-value < 0.01). The coefficient on the 
dummy-variable for the fixed matching protocol is negative (as one would expect from 
collusion) but it is not significant (p-value = 0.65). Based on the estimation results presented in 
(4), the experimenters should expect an average overbidding rate of about 22% when using the 
endowment equal to the prize value (endowment = 1) in a two-player contest (n = 2) with random 
matching (fixed = 0).  
Overall, the summary of the 30 experimental studies on contests reported in Table 1 and 
the estimation results of a simple OLS regression pose a number of interesting questions: Why 
do subjects overbid relative to the standard Nash equilibrium prediction? Why does overbidding 
                                                 
5
 We have also included a dummy-variable for those experiments that last for only one period. The dummy-variable 
is positive, but insignificant. 
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increase in the relative size of endowment and the number of players? The next section provides 
explanations to these questions. 
 
4. Overbidding in Contests 
4.1. Bounded Rationality 
We begin by discussing perhaps one of the most commonly cited explanations for 
overbidding – bounded rationality. Potters et al. (1998) conjecture that most subjects are likely to 
make mistakes, which add noise to the Nash equilibrium solution and thus may cause 
overbidding. Sheremeta (2011) tests this conjecture by applying the quantal response equilibrium 
(QRE) developed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). In the Nash equilibrium, players must only 
put positive probability on playing strategies that are best responses to other players’ equilibrium 
strategies. In the QRE, player   plays a mixed strategy    in which the probability of playing a 
pure strategy    is increasing in the expected payoff  (          ) of that strategy    given that 
others are playing the equilibrium mixed strategy    . The most commonly used specification of 
the QRE is the logistic QRE, where the player  ’s equilibrium probability of playing    is given 
by: 
       
   ( (         )  )
∫    ( (        )  ) 
,        (5) 
where   > 0 is a parameter that describes the level of noise in the decision making process. If 
   0, then the Nash equilibrium effort    is chosen with probability one. If    , then each 
effort    between 0 and the maximum allowed effort level (endowment in Table 1) is equally 
likely to be chosen. 
An implication of the QRE is that subjects who have higher endowments (and thus larger 
strategy space to make mistakes) are more likely to overbid. The intuition is simple. Consider a 
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subject who is completely confused and does not understand the rules of the game (i.e.,    ). 
According to the QRE, such a subject should make his decision by randomly choosing any effort 
level    between 0 and the endowment level. So, the higher is the endowment, the more likely it 
is that the confused subject chooses an effort that is higher than the Nash equilibrium.
6
 On the 
contrary, the lower the endowment, the lower is the probability that the confused subject 
overbids. 
Sheremeta (2011) explicitly tests the predictions of the QRE model by conducting two 
experimental treatments. In each treatment, four subjects (  = 4) compete in a lottery contest for 
a prize value of   = 120. In one treatment, subjects receive the endowment of 60 and in the other 
treatment subjects receive the endowment of 40. Note that the endowment is not binding relative 
to the Nash equilibrium of 22.5 (i.e.,              22.5). Figure 1 displays the expected 
average effort at the QRE as a function of   and endowment. When    , the behavior is 
consistent with the Nash equilibrium. When    , players move closer to a random play, and 
thus the average effort approaches 30 (overbidding) for the endowment of 60 and it approaches 
20 (underbidding) for the endowment of 40. Therefore, if subjects make substantial level of 
mistakes, then the average effort should be significantly higher in the treatment with the 
endowment of 60. Sheremeta (2011) finds that the actual average effort is 29.3 when the 
endowment is 60 and it is 21.0 when the endowment is 40, consistent with the predictions of the 
QRE.
7
 
                                                 
6
 In interpreting these results some caution is advised since changing the endowment also changes subjects’ wealth 
levels. If individuals have more wealth, they may be more willing to spend more of it regardless of the level of 
mistakes. Future research is needed to clearly separate these effects. 
7
 There are two potential explanations as to why subjects make mistakes. First, it is possible that subjects hold 
incorrect beliefs about the actions chosen by their opponents. Second, subjects may simply make errors in their own 
actions. The first explanation is less likely to be true. The main reason is that the best-response functions in contests 
are structured in such a way that if a subject believes that the opponent is going to either make higher or lower than 
the equilibrium effort, his best response is to always exert lower than the equilibrium effort. Therefore, errors in 
beliefs cannot explain overbidding. There is also substantial evidence of overbidding in sequential contests 
 10 
The findings of Sheremeta (2011) can explain why only 2 out of 30 studies reported in 
Table 1 do not find significant overbidding (i.e., Shogren and Baik, 1991; Schmidt et al., 2005). 
In both of these studies, the endowment is very small relative to the prize value. In Shogren and 
Baik (1991) subjects cannot exert efforts higher than 24, while the prize value is 32. In Schmidt 
et al. (2005) subjects can exert efforts only up to 20, while the prize value is 72. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that these two studies do not find overbidding. 
Bounded rationality can also explain why overbidding increases in the number of players. 
Lim et al. (2012) use the QRE to show that overbidding increases in the number of players   and 
find support for this prediction in a laboratory experiment. Specifically, they find that when there 
are two players (  = 2) in a contest, the overbidding rate           is 30%. When the number 
of players increases to 4 and then to 9, the overbidding rate increases to 61% and then further to 
230%.
8
 Therefore, it appears that bounded rationality can explain why the overbidding rate 
increases (i) in the relative size of endowment and (ii) in the number of contestants. 
 
4.2. Utility of Winning 
In addition to bounded rationality, another oft-cited explanation for overbidding is a non-
monetary utility of winning. The theoretical predictions in Section 3 are based on the assumption 
that subjects care only about the monetary value of the prize (i.e.,  ). However, subjects also 
may care about winning itself. Schmitt et al. (2004) argue that the persistent overbidding in 
numerous experimental studies (including their own) suggests that such behavior is not merely 
the result of subjects’ mistakes or misunderstanding of the experimental environment. They 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Fonseca, 2009). In such contests, subjects first observe the actions of their opponents and then make their decisions. 
However, even when subjects have perfect information about the actions of their opponents, they still choose to bid 
more than the equilibrium. 
8
 Similar findings on the impact of the number of contestants on the overbidding rate are documented by Anderson 
and Stafford (2003), Sheremeta (2011) and Morgan et al. (2012). 
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propose that winning may be a component in a subject’s utility. Sheremeta (2010) tests this 
hypothesis by directly eliciting such a utility from subjects. In the experiment, subjects 
participated in 30 periods of play in a four-player contest (i.e.,    4) with a prize value of 120 
(i.e.,    120). At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to submit their efforts for a 
prize value of 0 (i.e.,    0). Subjects were explicitly told that they would have to pay for their 
efforts and that they would not receive any monetary benefit in case they won. 
If subjects value only monetary payoffs, they should not exert any effort when the 
monetary prize value is zero. However, if subjects derive utility from winning itself, they may 
choose to exert positive efforts even when there is no monetary prize.
9
 Sheremeta (2010) finds 
that more than 40% of subjects exert positive efforts in the contest with a prize value of zero. 
Moreover, efforts in a contest with a zero prize are correlated with efforts in contests with a 
strictly positive prize. Figure 2 displays the correlation between an effort for a prize of   = 0 and 
an average (over 30 periods of play) effort for a prize of   = 120. According to the theoretical 
prediction, the Nash equilibrium effort is              = 22.5 when the prize is   = 120, 
and     0 when the prize is   = 0. Figure 2 shows that there is substantial heterogeneity in 
efforts, and subjects who exert higher efforts for the prize of 0 also exert higher efforts for the 
prize of 120 (Spearman’s correlation coefficient is 0.31, p-value < 0.01). Therefore, it appears 
that in addition to monetary utility, some subjects derive non-monetary utility of winning and 
such a utility can partially explain overbidding. 
Although the findings of Sheremeta (2010) have been replicated by other studies (Price 
and Sheremeta, 2011, 2012; Brookins and Ryvkin, 2011; Cason et al., 2011; Mago et al., 2012), 
                                                 
9
 Delgado et al. (2008) suggest that another explanation for overbidding, besides a utility of winning, is a disutility 
of losing. They provide evidence for the disutility of losing in the context of a first-price auction. Currently, there is 
no study examining the disutility of losing as a possible explanation for overbidding in contests. What is even a 
more interesting question is how to distinguish the utility of winning from the disutility of losing. These are 
interesting questions for future research. 
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there is still more scope for future research. For example, when eliciting utility of winning there 
may be several confounds, such as an experimenter demand effect (Zizzo, 2010) – subjects may 
feel obligated to submit efforts for the prize of value zero because the experimenter has asked 
them to do so. It may be also the case that subjects who make errors in assessing their effort 
strategies for a prize of positive value (see the discussion in Section 4.1) are also likely to make 
errors in bidding for a prize of value zero. Finally, even if subjects derive a utility of winning, the 
exact specification of such a utility function is not clear. 
One way to incorporate the utility of winning into a contest model described in Section 3, 
is to assume that in addition to the prize value  , individuals also have an additive utility of 
winning   (Sheremeta, 2010). Therefore, the updated expected payoff (2) of player   can be 
written as 
  (          )                     .      (6) 
Differentiating (6) with respect to    and accounting for the symmetric Nash equilibrium gives us 
a new equilibrium effort, which is a function of both a monetary ( ) and a non-monetary ( ) 
component: 
  
  
     
  
     .         (7) 
From (7) one can easily verify that    
               . An implication of this result is 
that compared to the standard Nash equilibrium effort    described by (3), equilibrium effort   
  
described by (7) implies overbidding (i.e.,   
    ). 
It is possible that the utility of winning is not additive and is not invariant to the value of 
the monetary prize  . In such a case, a correct specification of utility of winning would be 
      . It is also possible that the utility of winning depends on the number of contestants, 
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i.e.,       . As mentioned before, the correct specification of the utility of winning function 
is an important question for future research. 
 
4.3. Other-Regarding Preferences 
Related to the utility of winning, studies show that overbidding may be driven by spiteful 
preferences and inequality aversion (Herrmann and Orzen, 2008; Bartling et al., 2009; Fonseca, 
2009; Cason et al., 2011; Balafoutas et al., 2012; Mago et al., 2012).
10
 Balafoutas et al. (2012), 
for example, elicit other-regarding preferences using a binary choice elicitation procedure of 
Bartling et al. (2009), and find that spiteful and inequality-averse subjects exert significantly 
higher efforts in real-effort contests. Following the convention established in evolutionary game 
theory, Mago et al. (2012) propose a theoretical model in which subjects care not only about the 
utility of winning   but also about the absolute difference in payoffs, i.e.,  (          )  
 
 
 
∑  (          ) , where   is the interdependent social payoff parameter. Accounting for the 
behavioral factors captured by   and  , the expected utility for a risk-neutral player   is given by 
             (          )   
 
 
∑   (  (      ))        
                             
 
 
∑ (  (      )        ) . (8) 
The utility function (8) is most commonly used in evolutionary contest theory (Leininger, 
2003; Hehenkamp et al., 2004; Riechmann, 2007). The idea is that the objective of a contestant is 
not necessarily to maximize the expected payoff   (          ), but to “survive” by 
outperforming all rivals. This quest to seek a higher payoff relative to others is an evolutionary 
stable strategy, and it is also consistent with ‘spite’ (Hamilton,  970). Mago et al. (20 2) 
                                                 
10
 Sheremeta and Wu (2011) and Eisenkopf and Teyssier (2013) report similar findings in the context of rank-order 
tournaments. 
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interpret     as status-seeking behavior, i.e., contestants strive to obtain a higher relative 
payoff within the group. Herrmann and Orzen (2008) interpret     as aversion towards 
disadvantageous inequality. The utility function (7) also can capture pro-social behavior if    , 
i.e., contestants have preferences to increase the payoff of the entire group. 
Differentiating (8) with respect to    and accounting for the symmetric Nash equilibrium 
gives the equilibrium effort 
   
  
     
      
     .        (9) 
The equilibrium effort (9) increases in the utility of winning   (i.e.,     
      ) and increases 
in the status-seeking parameter   (i.e.,     
      ). 
In their experiment, Mago et al. (2012) find that 51% of subjects indicate positive utility 
of winning (   0) and 67% of subjects behave as status-seekers (   0). These findings suggest 
that overbidding in contests can also be explained by a combination of a utility of winning and 
relative payoff maximization. 
 
4.4. Probability Distortion 
Baharad and Nitzan (2008) illustrate theoretically how probability distortion of the CSF 
(1) can lead to overbidding. Building on the theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Baharad 
and Nitzan use an inverse S-shaped probability weighting function. According to this theory, 
individuals assign a distorted value      to the objective probability  . Thus, instead of CSF (1), 
subject’s perceived probability of winning is given by: 
     
  
               
.        (10) 
Figure 3 illustrates the distortion function (10), assuming    0.61, as in Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992). When facing relatively small probabilities (   0.33) the individual is 
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optimistic, since the distorted probability of winning      is higher than the objective 
probability  . When facing relatively large probabilities (   0.33) the individual is pessimistic, 
since   is underestimated. 
Given the distortion function (10), the expected payoff for an individual   is 
  (          )   (          )    .      (11) 
Differentiating (11) with respect to    and accounting for the symmetric Nash equilibrium gives 
the equilibrium effort 
  
  
     
  (        )
   (  
          
        
)  .      (12) 
When comparing   
  described by (12) to a standard Nash equilibrium effort    described by (3), 
we find that the overbidding rate    
         depends on the number of contestants  . For a 
relatively small number of contestants, probability distortion may result in underbidding. For 
example, with    2 and    0.61, the equilibrium effort (12) with distorted probability (10) is 
  
   0.13v, while the equilibrium effort (3) with no distortion is     0.25v. The intuition is that 
with only two contestants, the relatively high winning probabilities are underestimated and this 
substantially reduces the incentive to exert efforts in the contest.
11
 However, when the number of 
contestants is relatively large, probability distortion implies overbidding relative to the standard 
Nash equilibrium (i.e.,   
    ). For example, with    15 and    0.61, the equilibrium effort 
(12) with distorted probability is   
   0.07v, while the equilibrium effort (3) with no distortion is 
    0.06v. Note that the fact that overbidding increases in the number of players (due to 
distorted probabilities) can also help explain different overbidding rates reported in Table 1, and 
the estimation results reported in (4). 
                                                 
11
 Obviously, if in addition to distorted probabilities subjects also derive an additive utility of winning as in Section 
4.2, then the updated equilibrium effort    
   0.13(v + w) could be still greater than     0.25v, depending on the 
relative magnitude of the utility of winning (i.e.,    
     0. 2        ). 
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Parco et al. (2005) and Amaldoss and Rapoport (2009) apply the distorted probability 
function (10), combined with a utility of winning, to explain the pattern of the data observed in 
their contest experiments. They find that behavior of contestants can be well explained by a 
combination of a utility of winning and a distorted probability function. 
 
4.5. The Shape of the Payoff Function 
Subjects participating in a contest experiment are usually inexperienced. Therefore, it 
may be difficult for them to understand the precise incentives underlying the game. As described 
in Section 4.4, subjects may have distorted perception of probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992). They may also find it difficult to calculate the exact expected payoff, since the feedback 
they receive after each repetition of the contest game is very noisy: a subject either wins the prize 
or not. Moreover, it can be shown that the payoff function (2) is relatively flat around the Nash 
equilibrium. Figure 4 shows the expected payoff in a four-player contest (   4) as a function of 
effort  , given that the opponents play the Nash equilibrium    (the value of the prize v is 
normalized to 1). Given these parameters, the effort that maximizes the expected payoff is     
0.18v. It is easy to verify that even when the overbidding rate is 100% (i.e.,            1) 
subjects can still make almost 50% of the equilibrium payoff.  
Chowdhury et al. (2012) design an experiment aimed at examining how individual 
behavior is impacted by the specification of the payoff function (2). In a two-by-two design, they 
vary whether the prize is assigned probabilistically (i.e., efforts determine the probabilities of 
winning the prize) or proportionally (i.e., efforts determine the shares of the prize) and whether 
the cost function is linear or convex (see Figure 4), while holding the risk-neutral Nash 
equilibrium effort level constant. They find that compared to the probabilistic CSF, the 
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proportional rule results in effort levels that are closer to the risk-neutral prediction.
12
 The 
variance in individual efforts is also lower under the proportional rule and the distribution of 
individual efforts converges toward Nash equilibrium over time. Combining the proportional rule 
with a convex cost function further strengthens these results. 
Fallucchi et al. (2012) also find that using the proportional rule instead of the 
probabilistic CSF reduces overbidding. Masiliunas et al. (2012) further document that 
overbidding is also reduced when subjects play against computer opponents with pre-determined 
actions that subjects know when they make their choices. 
Overall, the results of Chowdhury et al. (2012), Masiliunas et al. (2012) and Fallucchi et 
al. (2012) suggest that overbidding in contests can be explained in part by the facts that (i) 
subjects have a hard time calculating the expected payoffs, (ii) the costs of deviation from the 
Nash equilibrium are relatively low, and (iii) there is not enough feedback for subjects to learn 
how the contest works. 
 
4.6. How to Reduce Overbidding 
We discussed in Section 3 that effort expenditures in contests are wasteful, in a sense that 
higher overbidding rates imply lower payoffs. Therefore, given the high rates of overbidding 
reported in Table 1, it is important to examine how one can reduce overbidding in contests. 
Recently, Price and Sheremeta (2012) showed that when subjects earn their endowments before 
participating in a lottery contest, their subsequent efforts in contests are lower than when 
endowments are given to them freely as “house money” (i.e., the money subjects risk comes 
from the experimenter rather than their own pockets). Furthermore, Price and Sheremeta (2011) 
                                                 
12
 Note that the proportional rule eliminates the utility of winning and thus less overbidding also might be due to the 
absence of the utility of winning, 
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show that subjects exert lower efforts when, instead of receiving money as a lump sum, they 
receive a small portion each period. Therefore, one way to reduce overbidding would be to let 
subjects earn their money and/or make this money available to them gradually during the 
duration of the entire experiment. 
Another way to reduce overbidding is to promote pro-social behavior among contestants. 
One such mechanism is communication. Cason et al. (2012), for example, find that when two 
contestants (or two competing groups) are allowed to communicate, they usually collude by 
exerting very low efforts (close to zero). Even when communication is not possible, there are 
other mechanisms through which subjects can still learn to reduce their efforts. Savikhin and 
Sheremeta (2013), for example, find that subjects reduce efforts in a lottery contest if they 
simultaneously participate in a public good game. Mago et al. (2012) find that subjects exert 
lower efforts in contests when their identities are reveled through photo display. The authors 
argue that photo display reduces social distance and enhances pro-social behavior, leading 
subjects to behave more cooperatively. 
Related to the question of how to reduce overbidding, and perhaps an even more 
fundamental question is whether subjects can avoid a potentially wasteful competition in a 
contest altogether. Kimbrough and Sheremeta (2012, 2013) propose side-payments as one such 
mechanism, where one player (proposer) can offer a side-payment to another (responder) in 
order to avoid potentially wasteful overbidding. Their experimental results indicate that subjects 
learn how to avoid contests even in the case when side-payments are not contracted. Kimbrough 
et al. (2011, 2013) suggest a random device (a coin flip) as a conflict resolution mechanism. 
They find that, instead of competing in a contest, subjects often use a fair coin flip (even in the 
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case when one player is relatively stronger than another or when the outcome of the coin flip is 
not binding). 
 
5. Heterogeneous Behavior in Contests 
Figure 5 displays a typically observed distribution of effort levels by subject. The data are 
taken from Chowdhury et al. (2012). Subjects are ordered by increasing average effort choices, 
which are indicated by diamonds. The boxplots display within-subject variation of effort. The 
Nash equilibrium prediction is that all subjects should choose the same effort of 15 (i.e., 
             = 15), since in the experiment there are   = 4 players competing for a prize of 
  = 80. It is important to emphasize again that there are no asymmetric equilibria in a lottery 
contest and the symmetric equilibrium is unique.
13
 Contrary to the theoretical predictions, Figure 
5 illustrates substantial between-subject heterogeneity (see the distribution of the diamonds) and 
within-subject heterogeneity (see the boxplots). 
Similar results are also found in Sheremeta and Zhang (2010), Sheremeta (2011), 
Masiliunas et al. (2012), and other studies reported in Table 1. An obvious and interesting 
question is: What can explain the between-subject and within-subject heterogeneity? In Sections 
5.1 and 5.2, we provide different preference-based and demographic-based explanations for 
between-subject heterogeneity.
14
 In Section 5.3, we provide explanations for within-subject 
heterogeneity. 
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 It is possible for multiple (asymmetric) equilibria to arise if one formally introduces behavioral considerations into 
a theoretical model of contests (see for example, Gill and Stone, 2010; Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2011; Cornes 
and Hartley, 2012; Minor, 2012).  
14
 Part of the observed heterogeneity can be also explained by the QRE model. In the QRE subjects draw their 
efforts from a mixed strategy distribution, and thus we should observe within-subject heterogeneity. Also, if we 
assume that different subjects have different cognitive abilities (and thus make different levels of mistakes), the 
QRE could also explain between-subject heterogeneity. Currently, there is no formal analysis of the QRE which 
would incorporate all these elements to explain behavior in contests, and such an analysis would be an important 
contribution. 
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5.1. Heterogeneous Preferences 
In Section 4.2, we suggested that in addition to monetary utility subjects may also have a 
non-monetary utility of winning. Moreover, as shown in Figure 2, some subjects have a higher 
valuation for winning than others. Therefore, one explanation for between-subject heterogeneity 
is heterogeneity of preferences towards winning (Sheremeta, 2010). Another explanation comes 
from the discussion in Section 4.3. Specifically, we have suggested that subjects have other-
regarding preferences, which are correlated with efforts in contests (Herrmann and Orzen, 2008; 
Balafoutas et al., 2012; Mago et al., 2012); and therefore, differences in these preferences can 
explain heterogeneous behavior of contestants. 
In addition to differences in other-regarding preferences, it is well documented that 
subjects have heterogeneous preferences towards risk, with most subjects being risk-averse (Holt 
and Laury, 2002). The equilibrium effort in (3) is based on the assumption that contestants are 
risk-neutral, but the standard result from the theoretical literature is that (unlike in first-price 
auctions) risk aversion implies lower efforts in contests (Hillman and Katz, 1984; Skaperdas and 
Gan, 1995).
15
 These predictions are supported by several experimental studies (Millner and Pratt, 
1991; Schmidt et al., 2005; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; Cason et al., 2011; Sheremeta, 2011), 
which find that risk-averse subjects exert lower efforts in lottery contests than risk-neutral or 
risk-seeking subjects. So in addition to heterogeneous preferences towards winning and others’ 
payoffs, heterogeneous behavior in contests can be also explained by differences in risk 
preferences. 
Cornes and Hartley (2012) propose yet another explanation based on loss aversion theory 
of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). They incorporate loss aversion into a standard contest model 
                                                 
15
 Although see Konrad and Schlesinger (1997) for a counter example. 
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by assuming that player   puts a weight of     if he loses the contest. In such a case the 
expected payoff (2) can be re-written as 
 (          )                                       .   (13) 
Differentiating (13) with respect to    and accounting for the symmetric Nash equilibrium gives 
the effort level of 
  
  
     
              
 .         (14) 
The comparative static prediction is that the equilibrium effort (14) decreases in the loss aversion 
parameter   (i.e.,    
      ). Note that, as with risk-aversion, loss-aversion implies 
underbidding. 
Kong (2008) conducted an experiment to test the predictions of Cornes and Hartley 
(2012). In the first stage of the experiment, subjects were classified into more and less loss-
averse according to elicited measures of each subject’s loss aversion (Kahneman et al., 1990). 
Comparing efforts of the two groups, Kong (2008) finds that, as predicted by Cornes and Hartley 
(2012), more loss-averse subjects exert lower efforts in contests. However, for any degree of loss 
aversion, there is significant overbidding (not predicted by loss aversion). Therefore, although 
loss aversion cannot explain the overbidding phenomenon, it can explain heterogeneous behavior 
of individuals in contests.
16
 
 
5.2. Demographic Differences 
So far we have discussed preference-based explanations for subjects’ heterogeneous 
behavior in contests. But perhaps the demographic differences are even more important. When a 
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 For theoretical considerations of loss aversion in rank-order tournaments see Gill and Stone (2010) and for 
experimental investigation see Gill and Prowse (2012) and Eisenkopf and Teyssier (2013). For implications of loss 
aversion in all-pay auctions see Ernst and Thöni (2010), Müller and Schotter (2010), and Klose and Sheremeta 
(2012). 
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subject comes to a laboratory experiment, she comes as an individual with certain demographic 
and individual characteristics that may have even influenced her decision to participate in the 
experiment in the first place. So, it should not be surprising that in the experiment subjects 
behave differently, although ex-ante they have symmetric roles. Although there is no systematic 
study examining how demographic and individual differences impact behavior in contests, there 
are several studies that may help shed some light. 
Perhaps one of the most important demographic differences that impact individual 
behavior in contests is gender (Mago et al., 2011; Brookins and Ryvkin, 2011; Price and 
Sheremeta, 2012).
17
 Price and Sheremeta (2012), for example, find that on average women exert 
25% higher efforts in lottery contests than men. Figure 6 displays the 3-period moving average 
effort by gender across all 30 periods of the experiment. The Nash equilibrium prediction is that 
both women and men should choose the same effort of 22.5 (i.e.,              = 22.5), 
since in the experiment there are   = 4 players competing for a prize of   = 120. It is clear, 
however, that both women and men overbid relative to the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, women 
persistently exert higher efforts than men throughout the experiment. Similar results are reported 
by Mago et al. (2011) in the setting of the best-of-three contests and Brookins and Ryvkin (2011) 
in the setting of incomplete information contests. These findings are also consistent with research 
on gender effects in auctions. Ham and Kagel (2006) and Casari et al. (2007), for example, find 
that women overbid more than men in common value auctions. Chen et al. (2013) find that 
women bid significantly higher and earn significantly less than men in the first-price auctions. 
                                                 
17
 There is also a large experimental literature examining gender attitudes toward tournaments. Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007), for example, design an experiment in which subjects can choose whether to enter a tournament 
or to be paid based on a piece-rate. They find that while the performance of men and women is not statistically 
different, men choose to participate in the tournament significantly more often than women. Niederle and Vesterlund 
conclude that women “shy away from competition”. These findings have been replicated by other studies (e.g., 
Cason et al., 2010; Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012; Price, 2012). 
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Finally, Ong and Chen (2012) find that women overbid more than men in all-pay auctions. It is 
intriguing that gender effects are similar in contests and auctions; however, more research is 
needed to examine the exact causes of such effects. Disregarding the causes for this gender 
difference in behavior, the fact that women overbid more than men can partially explain 
heterogeneous efforts in contest experiments.
18
 
Another demographic difference that can explain heterogeneous behavior in contests is 
religiosity. Price and Sheremeta (2012) find that subjects who indicate that “religion is very 
important in daily life” make 26% lower efforts in contests (see Figure 7). It is possible that more 
religious subjects are more risk averse and thus exert lower efforts in contests (Hilary and Hui, 
2009). However, Price and Sheremeta (2012) find that religiosity is a significant predictor of 
effort expenditures even after controlling for risk preferences. Another possibility is that more 
religious subjects are more pro-social (Ahmed, 2009; Benjamin et al., 2012) and more 
compassionate towards their counterparts (Batson et al., 1993; Regnerus et al., 1998), and thus 
they may yield the competition in contests in favor of others. Disregarding the exact reasons why 
religiosity impacts individual efforts in contests, it can help explain the observed heterogeneity 
of behavior.  
 
5.3. Learning and Hot Hand 
Previous Sections 5.1 and 5.2 provided a number of alternative explanations, based on 
preferences and demographics, for between-subject heterogeneity. In this section we focus on 
reasons for within-subject heterogeneity of effort. 
                                                 
18
 As a result of more overbidding, women receive significantly lower earnings from contests than men, suggesting 
that the ex-ante decision to “shy away from competition” (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) may actually be rational. 
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In Section 4.1, we have suggested that the QRE model can help explain overbidding in 
contests. According to the QRE model, a player draws an effort level    from a mixed strategy 
distribution    (see equation 5). Therefore, within-subject heterogeneity of effort can be 
explained by the QRE model. It is unlikely, however, that mistakes and errors are the only 
reasons why the same subject makes different efforts over the course of the experiment. 
At the beginning of the experiment most subjects overbid, so the best response is to 
reduce individual effort. Davis and Reilly (1998) were arguably the first to recognize that 
subjects learn to reduce their efforts in contests over the course of the experiment. Their findings 
have been replicated by numerous other studies (Herrmann and Orzen, 2008; Fonseca, 2009; 
Sheremeta, 2010, 2011; Price and Sheremeta, 2011, 2012; Brookins and Ryvkin, 2011; Mago et 
al., 2012). Figure 8 displays a typical pattern of the average effort (with standard errors) over the 
span of the experiment. The data are taken from Mago et al. (2012). Note that as subjects become 
more experienced, the average effort decreases, but remains significantly higher than the Nash 
equilibrium prediction. Moreover, even in the last periods of the experiment, efforts are 
heterogeneous, which is demonstrated by the error bars. 
Schmitt et al. (2004) point out another reason why individual efforts may fluctuate over 
the course of the experiment. Specifically, they find that subjects who won in period t-1 are more 
likely to make higher efforts in period t. Similar results are reported by Sheremeta and Zhang 
(2010) and Sheremeta (2011). Note that when documenting such correlations, the authors usually 
control for strategic uncertainty by including efforts as dependent variables. Sheremeta and 
Zhang (2010) point out the similarities of correlation between winning in period t-1 and higher 
efforts in period t to a “hot hand” phenomenon found in the gambling literature – belief in a 
positive autocorrelation of a non-autocorrelated random sequence (Gilovich et al., 1985; Chau 
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and Phillips, 1995; Croson and Sundali, 2005). Therefore, it appears that both learning and hot 
hand response by subjects may help explain within-subject variation of effort. 
 
5.4. How to Reduce Heterogeneity 
In the context of labor markets, where contest-like incentive schemes are commonly 
applied, a high variance in individual effort can impose a substantial cost on employers and 
decrease the overall efficiency of the work place (Lazear, 1999, 2000). Therefore, it is imperative 
to find ways how to reduce heterogeneity of individual behavior (Bull et al., 1987; Eriksson et 
al., 2009).
19
 There is no trivial solution to this problem. As we pointed out in Sections 5.2 and 
5.3, the likely causes of heterogeneous behavior in contests are differences in individual 
preferences and demographic differences. It is hard to imagine a mechanism that would 
homogenize individual preferences towards winning, inequality, risk and losses. Perhaps even 
harder (if not impossible) would be to eliminate demographic differences. Nevertheless, we want 
to point out three alternative mechanisms that may reduce heterogeneity of behavior that is due 
to subjects making mistakes in contests: (i) group decision-making, (ii) feedback, and (iii) 
simplified payoff functions. All three mechanisms are targeted to reduce subjects’ cognitive load 
and enhance subjects’ learning of the contest environment (Devetag and Warglien, 2003; Burks 
et al., 2009). 
It is well documented that groups are better at making decisions that are more in line with 
game-theoretic predictions than individuals (Charness and Sutter, 2012). One implication of this 
result is that groups should choose more homogeneous efforts in contests since theory predicts a 
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 It is also well documented that, theoretically (Baik, 1994; Stein, 2002), heterogeneity between players leads to 
lower aggregate effort. These predictions are also supported by laboratory experiments (Davis and Reilly, 1998; 
Anderson and Stafford, 2003; Fonseca, 2009; Anderson and Freeborn, 2010; Kimbrough et al., 2011). Therefore, in 
addition to ex-post negative effect of heterogeneous behavior, heterogeneity may negatively impact strategic 
behavior in contests ex-ante. 
 26 
unique equilibrium defined by (3). Sheremeta and Zhang (2010) test this conjecture by 
comparing efforts chosen by groups of two subjects versus efforts chosen by individual subjects. 
They find that group efforts are more homogeneous and result in 25% lower efforts than 
individual efforts. As a result, groups receive significantly higher and more homogeneous 
payoffs than individuals. Sheremeta and Zhang suggest that groups perform better because they 
reduce individual mistakes through group communication and they learn faster than individuals. 
Another mechanism that may help subjects to learn faster is feedback. Mago et al. (2012) 
experimentally examine different levels of feedback in contests. In some experimental sessions, 
subjects only receive feedback about whether they won the contest or not. In other sessions, 
subjects receive full feedback about all group members’ efforts. Mago et al. find that providing 
information feedback about others’ efforts makes effort levels more uniform within a given 
group, and thus reduces between-subject heterogeneity. Fallucchi et al. (2012) find that not only 
does feedback reduce heterogeneity, but it can also reduce overbidding in the long-run (i.e., 
when the experiment is repeated for 60 periods). 
Finally, it is possible to reduce between-subject as well as within-subject heterogeneity 
by using a more simplified payoff function. We have already discussed in Section 4.5 that using 
the proportional rule, instead of the probabilistic CSF, reduces overbidding (Chowdhury et al., 
2012; Fallucchi et al., 2012; Masiliunas et al., 2012). Moreover, Chowdhury et al. (2012) find 
that not only does the proportional rule reduce overbidding, but it also significantly decreases 
between-subject and within-subject heterogeneity. This is mainly because the proportional rule 
gives subjects an opportunity to better learn the payoff structure of the contest, and thus subjects 
learn to make fewer errors. 
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6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Contests are prevalent in the fields of economics, management, biology, law and political 
science and have attracted the attention of many theorists. It is difficult, however, to test 
theoretical predictions in the field because efforts are unobservable. For that reason, researchers 
have turned to controlled laboratory experiments that allow measuring the actual efforts in 
contests, while controlling for relative abilities of contestants and the amount of noise in the 
contest; for a review of experimental literature see Dechenaux et al. (2012). 
In this paper, we provide an overview of experimental literature on lottery contests and 
point out the two main phenomena observed in almost all contest experiments: (i) overbidding 
relative to the standard Nash equilibrium prediction and (ii) heterogeneous behavior of ex-ante 
symmetric contestants. 
We provide a number of explanations in Sections 4.1-4.5 for the overbidding 
phenomenon, including (1) bounded rationality, (2) utility of winning, (3) other-regarding 
preferences (spite, inequality-aversion), (4) probability distortion, and (5) the shape of the payoff 
function. Obviously, these explanations are not exhaustive. Other potential candidates, for 
example, are regret (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2007; Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay, 2007) and 
overconfidence (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Park and Santos-Pinto, 2010). Although both of 
these factors are likely to add to the observed overbidding, no experimental study has 
systematically examined regret and overconfidence in relationship to behavior in contests.
20
 This 
is an interesting avenue for future research. 
Based on the sample of contest experiments that we review, the median overbidding rate 
is 72%. Moreover, in some studies the overbidding rate is so high that subjects on average earn 
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 Hyndman et al. (2012) study how regret aversion impacts individual behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete 
information. 
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negative payoffs. Given such high empirical rates of overbidding, it is imperative to develop and 
investigate different mechanisms that can reduce overbidding (i.e., conflict de-escalation) or 
maybe even prevent conflicts altogether (i.e., conflict resolution). We suggest several 
mechanisms in Section 4.6 through which overbidding can be reduced, including restricted 
distribution of pre-experimental endowments, communication, and social identity. We also 
suggest several conflict resolution mechanisms, such as side-payments and the use of 
randomization devices. The field of conflict resolution is very new and there are many 
interesting questions for future research pertaining to both conflict de-escalation and conflict 
resolution. 
 It is important to emphasize that overbidding in contests can also be used to increase 
economic welfare. In many applications, high contest expenditures may be viewed as preferable 
from the standpoint of the contest designer. For instance, in labor tournaments (Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981), effort is viewed as valuable because it contributes to the firm’s output. In sports 
competitions (Szymanski, 2003), efforts have large positive externalities on fans and viewers. 
Similarly, in contests used to finance public goods (Morgan and Sefton, 2000) and raise money 
for charities (Landry et al., 2006), efforts provide significant positive externalities. Finally, 
overbidding in contests is good news for prize-linked savings mechanisms that use lottery 
contests to stimulate savings (Tufano, 2008). 
Unlike overbidding, heterogeneous behavior of individuals is mostly viewed as negative, 
because such behavior creates unnecessary uncertainty and imposes a substantial cost on the 
contest designer (Bull et al., 1987; Lazear, 1999, 2000; Eriksson et al., 2009). In Sections 5.1-5.3 
we provide explanations for heterogeneous behavior in contests based on (1) differences in 
preferences towards winning, inequality, risk and losses, and (2) demographic differences. There 
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are other potential candidates to explain heterogeneous behavior of contestants that have not 
been explored yet. First, it is possible that there are different types in the population of subjects 
(for example see Herrmann and Orzen, 2008). Second, it is well documented that emotions are 
predictable and predictive of individual behavior in experimental games (Xiao and Houser, 2005; 
Schniter et al., 2011, 2013); therefore, individuals experiencing different emotions may exert 
different efforts in contests. Theoretically, we should expect individuals experiencing hate and 
revenge to exert higher effort (Amegashie and Runkel, 2012) and individuals experiencing guilt 
and shame to exert lower effort (Behrendt and Ben-Ari, 2012) in contests. Also, it is well 
documented that subjects have different personality traits, such as the Big Five personality 
characteristics (Kurzban and Houser, 2001; Borghans et al., 2008), and different cognitive 
abilities, as measured by IQ and SAT scores (Frey and Detterman, 2004). Future research should 
examine how these differences impact individual behavior in contests. 
In Section 5.4 we discussed several mechanisms that can reduce heterogeneity of 
behavior that is due to subjects making mistakes in contests, such as group decision-making, 
feedback, and simplified payoff functions. The idea is that mechanisms that reduce cognitive 
load (Devetag and Warglien, 2003; Burks et al., 2009) and enhance subjects’ learning of the 
contest environment should induce more homogeneous behavior. Given the potentially negative 
consequences of effort heterogeneity, future research should search for new mechanisms to 
induce more homogeneous behavior in contests. 
On a more fundamental level, it is important to closely examine the main underlying 
factors that can explain individual behavior in contests. For example, although the factors 
contributing to the overbidding phenomenon (such as utility of winning, spite, status-seeking, 
mistakes, probability distortion, etc.) are frequently cited, it remains an open question as to 
 30 
whether some of these factors are correlated and if so, which are the most important ones. The 
overall impact of this correlation on individual and group behavior remains unknown. Similarly, 
probability distortion may be correlated with mistakes, risk-aversion, and loss-aversion; 
however, it is important to know which factors are the most important in explaining individual 
behavior in contests. The answers to these questions would significantly advance our 
understanding of the field. 
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Figure 1: Endowment and the Expected Average Effort at the QRE. 
 
 
Figure 2: Utility of Winning. 
 
Note: The data are taken from Sheremeta (2010). 
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Figure 3: Probability Distortion. 
 
 
Figure 4: Linear versus Convex Costs. 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
distorted probability
linear probability
d(p) 
p 
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
linear costs
convex costs
E(π) 
e 
Nash Equilibrium 
Overbidding 
e* 
 40 
Figure 5: Distribution of Efforts in a Lottery Contest. 
 
Note: The data are taken from Chowdhury et al. (2012). 
 
Figure 6: Average Effort by Gender. 
 
Note: The data are taken from Price and Sheremeta (2012). 
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Figure 7: Average Effort by Religiosity. 
 
Note: The data are taken from Price and Sheremeta (2012). 
 
Figure 8: Average Effort over 20 Periods of Experiment. 
 
Note: The data are taken from Mago et al. (2012). 
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Table 1: Summary of Lottery Contest Experiments. 
Study Year Treatment Name Matching Endowment 
Prize  
value 
v 
Number of  
players 
n 
Predicted  
effort 
e* 
Actual  
effort 
e 
Overbidding  
rate 
(e- e*)/e* 
Millner and Pratt 1989 Lottery Random 12 8 2 2.00 2.24 12% 
Millner and Pratt 1991 Less risk-averse Random 12 8 2 2.00 2.45 23% 
Shogren and Baik 1991 Lottery Fixed 24 32 2 8.00 8.11 1% 
Davis and Reilly 1998 Lottery Fixed Cash balance 200 4 37.50 54.97 46% 
Potters et al. 1998 Lottery Random 15 12 2 3.00 5.05 68% 
Anderson and Stafford 2003 Homogeneous One shot 5 5 2 1.25 2.42 94% 
   One shot 5 5 3 1.11 2.00 80% 
   One shot 5 5 4 0.94 2.25 139% 
   One shot 5 5 5 0.80 2.85 256% 
   One shot 5 5 10 0.45 1.33 196% 
Schmitt et al. 2004 Static Random 150 120 2 30.00 52.70 76% 
Schmidt et al. 2005 Single-prize One shot 20 72 4 13.5 9.4 -30% 
Herrmann and Orzen 2008 Direct repeated Random 16 16 2 4.00 8.20 105% 
Kong 2008 Less loss averse Fixed 300 200 3 44.44 80.56 81% 
Fonseca 2009 Simultaneous Random 300 200 2 50.00 100.08 100% 
Abbink et al. 2010 1:1 Fixed 1000 1000 2 250 513 105% 
Sheremeta 2010 One-Stage Random 120 120 4 22.5 34.1 52% 
Sheremeta and Zhang 2010 Individual Random 120 120 4 22.5 43.8 95% 
Ahn et al. 2011 Individual Fixed Cash balance 1000 2 250 342.5 37% 
Deck and Jahedi 2011 Baseline One shot 5 5 2 1.25 2.05 64% 
Price and Sheremeta 2011 P treatment Random 120 120 4 22.5 42.8 90% 
Sheremeta 2011 GC Random 60 120 4 22.5 30.0 33% 
  SC Random 60 60 2 15.0 19.7 31% 
Cason et al. 2012 Individual Fixed 60 60 2 15.0 18.96 26% 
Chowdhury et al. 2012 PL Random 80 80 4 15.0 26.2 75% 
Fallucchi et al. 2012 Own-Stochastic Fixed 1000 1000 3 222 368.5 66% 
Faravelli and Stanca 2012 LOT Random 800 1600 2 400 440.8 10% 
Lim et al. 2012 N=2 Random 1200 1000 2 250 325 30% 
  N=4 Random 1200 1000 4 187.5 302 61% 
  N=9 Random 1200 1000 9 98.8 326 230% 
Mago et al. 2012 NPNI Fixed 80 80 4 15.0 29.1 94% 
Masiliunasy et al. 2012 N1S1 Random 16 16 2 4.00 4.98 25% 
Morgan et al. 2012 Small prize Fixed 100 50 2 12.5 21.5 72% 
   Fixed 100 50 3 11.1 16.1 45% 
   Fixed 100 50 4 9.4 21.7 131% 
Price and Sheremeta 2012 Gift Random 120 120 4 22.5 43.2 92% 
Ke et al. 2013 Baseline Random 250 450 3 100 150 50% 
Kimbrough and Sheremeta 2013 Baseline Random 60 60 2 15.0 29.3 95% 
Savikhin and Sheremeta 2013 Baseline Fixed 80 80 4 15.0 33.5 123% 
 
